Sections 01–03 set the scope and the layered model. Section 04 is the substantive access-control specification — the factors required at each layer and the mechanism that enforces them. Sections 05–07 cover the governance around those factors: who may authorise access, how it is provisioned, and how it is re-proved and recorded. Sections 08–09 cover surveillance and evidence retention. Sections 10–11 cover detection, response and audit.

The physical security estate at Knowledge Oasis Muscat is specified, supplied and commissioned from the TKH Security Solutions portfolio — Siqura surveillance, TKH access control and the VDG Sense video management system. The official Siqura distributor appointment for the region is held by AlHudebiya International, a company of the founders' group, so the stack is procured and engineered directly rather than through a reseller chain. The appointment is reproduced at section 02.

This document states what is controlled, how identity is proven at each layer, how long evidence is kept, and how entitlements are re-proved on a schedule. It is written to be audited: every commitment names the record that evidences it.

This specification covers the physical security of the KOM Oman AI Factory: the site perimeter, the building envelope, the interior zones, the data halls and the racks and customer cages within them. It covers the systems that control and record entry, and the organisation that operates them.

Logical security of customer workloads — network segmentation, identity for compute resources, encryption — sits outside this document and is governed by the customer's own controls and by the Information Security programme referenced in section 11.

1. No unaccompanied presence without an entitlement. Every person inside a controlled layer is either an entitled holder authenticated at that layer, or an escorted visitor recorded against a named host.
2. Identity proven, not asserted. A single credential never opens a controlled layer. Each controlled layer requires at least two independent factors, and the data hall and rack layers require a biometric factor that cannot be lent or copied.
3. Every event recorded and reconstructable. Access grants, denials, alarms and video are recorded to a common timeline so any event can be reconstructed from independent sources.
4. Entitlements decay by default. Access is time-bounded and must be positively re-affirmed by a named manager on a schedule; anything not re-affirmed is withdrawn.
5. Customer isolation. A customer's cage or rack row is accessible only to that customer's nominated holders and to a defined list of Prima roles, each recorded separately.

The physical security estate is delivered from the TKH Security Solutions portfolio, a division of the TKH Group. TKH supplies all four disciplines this specification requires — access control, surveillance, intrusion detection and video management — so the estate is built as one integrated system rather than assembled from unrelated vendors.

AlHudebiya International — a company of the founders' group — holds the official distributor appointment for the Siqura portfolio, granted by Siqura B.V. and reproduced overleaf. This is the material point for a customer or lender: the security stack is not bought through a reseller chain. It is specified, procured, commissioned and maintained by a party that holds the vendor relationship directly.

• Direct supply — commercial. Equipment procured on distributor terms, with no intermediate margin and no dependency on a third-party integrator's roadmap or stock position.
• In-house engineering — technical. Design, commissioning and configuration performed by engineers already certified on the portfolio, not learned on this project.
• Lifecycle continuity — operational. Firmware, spares and support handled on the vendor channel for the life of the asset, escalating into the manufacturer rather than a reseller.

The certificate below is the vendor-side evidence for section 02. It is reproduced so a customer, auditor or lender can verify the channel position without a separate request. The original is held by AlHudebiya International and available for inspection.

Certificate of official distributorship — Siqura B.V.Issued 12 June 2016

The site is organised into five concentric layers. Each layer is a separate control point with its own credential set, its own approving authority and its own audit trail. Passing one layer confers no rights at the next — entitlements are granted per layer, not per person.

Every layer that a person can enter requires at least two independent factors drawn from different categories — something held, something known, something inherent. The factor set strengthens with depth, and the innermost layers require a factor that cannot be transferred between people.

1. No credential sharing. Badges are issued to a named individual, carry a photograph, and are void on transfer. A biometric enrolment cannot be delegated. Sharing is a disciplinary matter and a reportable security event.
2. Anti-passback. A credential presented for entry cannot be presented again for entry without an intervening exit. Tailgating attempts are alarmed at L2 and L4 and reviewed against video.
3. Single occupancy at the airlock. The L4 interlock admits one authenticated person per cycle. Equipment movements use the loading route under escort, not the personnel airlock.
4. Reason code at L4. Data hall entry records a reason — maintenance, installation, incident, customer visit, audit — selected at the reader and reconciled against the ticket record monthly.
5. Time-bounding. Every entitlement carries an expiry. Permanent staff entitlements expire at the next recertification cycle; contractor and visitor entitlements expire at the end of the booked window and cannot be extended at the reader.
6. Denial handling. Three consecutive denials on one credential locks it and raises an alarm to the NOC. Unlock requires identity verification by the Security Manager, recorded.
7. Duress. A duress PIN variant is available at L2 and L3 and raises a silent alarm to the NOC and the officer post.

Access is granted through a single request path with a named approver per layer. There is no informal route — an entitlement that does not exist in the access platform does not exist, and a door that opens without a matching record is a reportable incident.

• Separation of duties. The person who approves an entitlement may not be the person who provisions it. Approval sits with the layer authority; provisioning sits with the security administration function.
• No standing privileged access. Administrative access to the access-control and video platforms is granted per task and expires; there are no permanent administrator sessions.
• Emergency access. A break-glass entitlement exists for life-safety and critical-incident response. Use is alarmed in real time, reviewed by the CISO within one business day, and reported to the affected customer where a cage was entered.
• Customer nominees. Each customer maintains a nominee list with Prima. Changes take effect only on written instruction from an authorised contact and are confirmed back in writing.
• Lost credentials. Reported immediately; the credential is voided on report, not on replacement. A replacement requires re-verification of identity.

No visitor holds an unescorted entitlement beyond the interior zone. A visitor inside a data hall is at all times within sight of a named escort who holds an entitlement for that layer and who remains accountable for the visitor's actions.

1. One escort, bounded party. An escort may accompany no more than four visitors within a data hall. Larger parties require additional escorts, recorded individually.
2. Line of sight. The escort maintains continuous line of sight. Loss of sight of an escorted visitor is a reportable security event and is reviewed against video.
3. No credential lending. The escort authenticates for the party at each layer. A visitor never holds a credential that opens L4 or L5.
4. Media and equipment. Cameras, removable media and tooling are declared on entry and reconciled on exit. Photography inside white space requires prior written approval and, where another customer's assets are in view, that customer's consent.
5. Accountability. The escort is recorded as accountable for the visit and signs the visit record on exit. The record names both parties and the areas entered.

Entitlements are not permanent. Every holder's access is re-proved on a schedule by a named manager who must positively confirm it is still required. Anything not confirmed within the cycle is withdrawn automatically — the default outcome of silence is revocation. Contractor and vendor entitlements are additionally confirmed monthly by Procurement and Facilities.

• Dormancy. A credential unused for 60 days at L4 or L5 is suspended automatically and requires manager re-approval to restore.
• Anomaly review. Out-of-pattern access — unusual hours, unusual hall, high frequency — is flagged weekly to the CISO and reconciled against tickets.
• Leaver reconciliation. HR leaver and contract-end feeds are reconciled against live entitlements weekly, independent of the review cycles.

Surveillance is continuous rather than motion-triggered, so the record is complete and a gap is detectable. Coverage is specified so that any route from the perimeter to a rack can be reconstructed end to end from overlapping fields of view, with no unobserved segment.

• Continuously staffed. Surveillance is monitored 24×7 from the Network Operations Centre alongside the officer post; there is no unattended period.
• Camera health as a service metric. The proportion of cameras delivering a usable image is measured and reported monthly; a critical-zone camera out of service for more than 24 hours is a reportable exception.
• Correlated timeline. Video, access-control events and intrusion alarms share a synchronised clock, so an access grant and the corresponding footage align without manual reconciliation.

Retention is committed, not best-effort: storage is sized for the full period at the specified resolution and frame rate, so the window cannot be silently shortened by capacity pressure. Retention is enforced per device — which is how critical zones are held longer than standard zones on one system.

1. No early deletion. Footage cannot be deleted before its retention expiry. There is no operator function to purge a period, and no administrative account holds that right unilaterally.
2. Export under dual control. Evidence export requires two authorised persons, one being the CISO or delegate. Each export is logged with requester, reason, period and cameras.
3. Playback is audited. Every playback session is logged with the operator, the period viewed and the cameras accessed. Reviewing footage is itself an auditable act.
4. Verifiable copies and custody. Exported evidence carries a cryptographic hash and manifest so a recipient can establish it has not been altered; external releases are recorded on a custody register naming recipient, authority and date.
5. Gap accountability. Any interruption in recording is alarmed, ticketed and reported monthly with cause and duration — treated as a security event, not a technical footnote.

• Customer request. Footage and access records relating to its own cage or rack row, for any period within retention — answered within 5 business days at no charge.
• Third-party privacy. Where a request would expose another customer's assets or personnel the export is masked or the frame restricted; no customer receives footage revealing another's operations.
• Legal and regulatory. Disclosure to authorities only on lawful instruction, recorded on the custody register and notified to any affected customer unless notification is itself prohibited.

Storage media is the one asset class that can carry customer data out of the facility in a pocket. The controlling rule is short: no storage medium leaves the site in a readable state, and no medium is treated as sanitised without a record that proves it.

Scope covers customer media inside GPU nodes and the storage tier; Prima's own media in the access-control, surveillance, BMS and EPMS systems; and transient media — spares, RMA returns, removable devices and printed material.

1. Removal. Logged against rack and serial, with reason and ticket reference. Removal from L5 is on video.
2. Secure holding. Sanitisation-pending media is held in a locked cage inside L4, itself under camera, with a signed register entry per movement.
3. Execution on site. Where a third party performs destruction it is performed on site, under Prima escort and on camera. Media is not transported off the perimeter for destruction.
4. Verification. Purge verified by read-back sampling; Destroy verified by inspection of particle size against the specification above.
5. Certificate. A certificate of sanitisation or destruction is issued per medium, naming method, operator, witness, date and serial.
6. Reconciliation. Certificates are reconciled monthly against the removal log. An unreconciled serial is a reportable security event.

Prima operates in the Sultanate of Oman and complies with lawful instruction. The position is stated in advance and is deliberately narrow: lawful authority is met, nothing is volunteered, scope is held to what the instrument compels, and the affected customer is told — unless telling is itself prohibited.

1. Written instrument required. Access to records, to the facility beyond the interior zone, or to a customer's equipment requires a warrant, court order or statutory demand identifying its legal basis. A verbal request is logged and declined.
2. No voluntary disclosure. Prima discloses no customer data, record or equipment to any authority absent a compelling instrument, and grants no informal access.
3. Legal review before compliance. Every instrument is reviewed by the General Counsel — or external counsel out of hours — for validity and scope before anything is produced.
4. Narrowest scope. Production is limited to what the instrument names. Where an instrument is drawn more broadly than its stated purpose requires, Prima seeks to narrow it.
5. Customer first where lawful. The affected customer is notified before compliance wherever the instrument permits, so that it can exercise its own legal rights.
6. Everything logged. Instrument, reviewer, decision, what was produced, to whom and when — recorded on the disclosure register and retained.

• Inventory before release. Each item photographed in situ and after removal; serials and rack positions recorded; the officer's receipt copied to the customer.
• No assistance with extraction. Prima produces the physical asset the instrument names. It does not decrypt, image or otherwise assist in accessing customer data absent a separate compelling order.
• Evidence hold. All video and access records for the event window are placed under hold and survive the retention clock in section 09.

• Where notification is prohibited Prima notifies the customer as soon as the prohibition lapses or is lifted, and challenges or seeks to narrow a non-disclosure order where there are reasonable grounds to do so.
• Annual statement. Where lawful, Prima reports annually the number of requests received, complied with, and declined or narrowed — without identifying customers.

Detection is layered in the same way as access. An intrusion attempt should be detected at the perimeter, verified on video within seconds, and met by an officer before it reaches the building envelope. Alarms escalate on the clock without waiting for a human decision.

Escalation is time-based and automatic. A security alarm classifies as P1 under the Service Level Agreement where it involves an unauthorised presence beyond L3, a forced entry at any layer, or a tamper at L5 — and inherits the P1 response, update and root-cause obligations set out there.

• Automatic evidence preservation. An alarm at L4 or L5 places the surrounding video window under hold, so the footage survives the retention clock regardless of when the investigation starts.
• Officer coverage. 24×7 officer presence with documented patrol routes and randomised timing; patrol completion is logged and reviewed weekly.
• Exercises. Response is exercised quarterly against a scripted scenario, including a tailgate attempt, a forced door and a lost-credential event. Results and corrective actions are recorded.
• External liaison. Documented liaison with local police and civil defence, including site plans, contact protocol and pre-agreed access arrangements for emergency responders.
• False alarms. Tracked as a quality metric; a device generating repeated false alarms is remediated rather than tolerated or suppressed.

The controls here are designed to be evidenced against recognised frameworks and tested by a third party — every control names the record that proves it.

• Customer audit — annual, at no charge. One on-site security audit per contract year on 15 business days notice, escorted, covering these controls as they apply to the customer's assets.
• For-cause audit. An additional audit following a security event affecting the customer, on 5 business days notice, without waiting for the annual cycle.
• Records inspection. Remote inspection of access, visitor and recertification records relating to the customer's assets, at any time within retention.

• Within 4 hours. Unauthorised access to a customer's cage or rack row, or tamper at L5 on its assets.
• Within 24 hours. Unauthorised presence beyond L3, forced entry, or a recording gap over one hour in a critical zone.
• Written report — 5 business days. Timeline, cause, containment and preventive action, with evidence under hold.